VOIR DIRE IS IMPORTANT TO IDENTIFY BIASED JURORS

The following quotes illustrate the importance of allowing lawyers to conduct adequate voir dire so that biased jurors aren't allowed to sit in judgement of their peers.

• "The very essence of due process would be denied if one or more members of a jury panel were allowed to remain as jurors while harboring a bias or prejudice toward one of the parties." Allison v. Dept of Labor, 401 P.2d 982 (1965).

• Although the judge has a duty to restrict the examination of the prospective jurors within reasonable bounds to expedite trial, the fixing of an arbitrary time limit for voir dire in advance of trial is dangerous and could lead to reversal on appeal. People v. Hernandez, 94 Cal App. 3d 715 (1979).

 

• Jurors should be excused for cause if their particular beliefs will "prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as a juror in accordance with the instructions and oath." Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).

 

• An initial "leaning" is not disqualifying if it represents skepticism rather than an unshakable conviction. Cortez v. HCCI-San Antonio, Inc., 159 SW3d 87, 91, 94 (2005).

 

• The prospective juror is presumed qualified and competent, and the burden of proof is on the party advancing the challenge to prove otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence. Ortis v. Stevenson-Carson School Dist., 812 P.2d 133 (1991).

 

• "Coaxed recantations" in response to leading questions by counsel "fail to demonstrate" the impartiality required of jurors. State v. Braunreiter, 185 P.3d 1024 (2008).

 

• Clarification of Potential Bias is Proper, Rehabilitation is Not:

• Voir dire gives the parties and opportunity to develop information that might disclose a potential juror’s specific bias in a suit of the type at trial. In conducting the voir dire examination, the trial court must evaluate whether a juror can lay aside preconceived impressions or opinions and render a verdict based solely upon the evidence presented in court, the instructions given by the judge, and the requirements of the juror’s oath. This frequently involves asking follow-up questions designed to probe jurors’ initial responses in order to clarify or interpret those responses. In making such an evaluation, however, a trial court cannot accept without question a simple promise by the juror to be fair and impartial if it follows several previous statements of obvious bias by the juror because . . . notwithstanding that the juror may be sincere in expressing a desire to be fair and impartial, the psychological impact of requiring such a declaration before the juror’s peers and a judge could render the promise unreliable.

Irvin v. Dodd, 366 US 717 (1961).